Britain Had The World's Most Successful Drug Policy For Half A Century

The question of suppressing psychoactive drug use usually comes down to two options: a) criminalising supply and usage, or b) regulating legal supply. However, the metacognitive puzzle underneath the political conundrum (if we accept the moral premise it should be minimised) is the use of psychoactives is endogenous to humans. For 12,000 years, Homo sapiens has consumed substances which play games with neurotransmitters, as have a wide range of animals. It's not going away. The UNODC consistently estimate 5-6% of any population (1 in 20) are inclined to consume drugs, legal or not. In the UK, it is around 8%.

How do you solve a problem like endogeny using law? Can one really make plants illegal? One might appeal to nature and argue murder is also endogenous, but it quickly becomes absurd. If you're a British politician these days, you fire scientists who explain scientific facts.

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Britain maintained an essentially unregulated drug market. Opium and cocaine preparations were not merely available but ubiquitous, sold openly in pharmacies, general stores, and even through mail-order catalogs. These substances formed the backbone of countless patent medicines and therapeutic tonics, marketed to treat everything from headaches and coughs to melancholia and fatigue.

The famous Mrs. Winslow's Soothing Syrup, containing morphine, was routinely administered to teething infants, while cocaine-based preparations were advertised as cure-alls for a vast array of ailments. This liberal approach reflected the Victorian era's faith in commercial freedom and the belief individuals should be free to make their own choices regarding consumption, provided they did not directly harm others.

Drug use carried little social stigma, particularly when it occurred within the context of medical treatment or self-medication. The distinction between recreational and medicinal use was often blurred, and habituation (aka "addiction') was generally viewed as a personal misfortune rather than a moral failing or criminal behaviour.

This era of tolerance began to crumble in the face of mounting concerns which emerged during and immediately after World War I. Soldiers returning from the Western Front often carried with them addictions developed through legitimate medical treatment of war wounds, or through self-medication to cope with the psychological trauma of trench warfare ("Shell Shock"). Morphine, widely used for pain relief in military hospitals, created a population of addicted veterans who continued to seek the drug upon their return to civilian life. The sight of decorated war heroes reduced to desperate drug-seeking behaviour proved deeply disturbing to a society that had idealised these men as national heroes.

Simultaneously, the war years witnessed the emergence of drug use within London's criminal underworld. What had previously been seen as medical aids or personal comforts became associated with vice, criminality, and social disorder. Reports of theft, fraud, and violence committed by individuals seeking to obtain or pay for their drug supplies were growing. This criminal association was particularly troubling because it suggested drug use was not merely a private matter but could have broader social consequences.

The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1920 criminalised the unauthorised distribution and use of morphine, cocaine, and later cannabis, marking a decisive break with the previous era of commercial freedom. However, the act contained a crucial exception that would prove central to subsequent British drug policy: it continued to permit doctors to prescribe these substances to patients they deemed medically appropriate candidates, including those already addicted to the drugs.

This medical exception reflected the government's recognition complete prohibition might drive addicted individuals toward dangerous illegal sources or create a humanitarian crisis among those dependent on these substances for daily functioning. It also acknowledged the medical profession's claims addiction represented a legitimate medical condition requiring therapeutic intervention rather than criminal punishment.

By the early 1920s, government officials and medical leaders became increasingly concerned about the quantities of addictive drugs being prescribed to certain patients and whether some physicians might be enabling addiction rather than treating it. Reports circulated of doctors who seemed overly generous in their prescribing practices, potentially creating or sustaining addiction rather than addressing underlying medical needs. These concerns were compounded by uncertainty about the appropriate medical response to addiction itself - was continued prescribing a legitimate form of maintenance therapy, or was it simply a form of licensed drug dealing?

The medical profession found itself divided on these fundamental questions. Some physicians argued gradual withdrawal was the only ethical approach and continued prescribing merely prolonged suffering while enabling destructive behaviour. Others contended abrupt cessation of drugs could cause severe withdrawal symptoms which were both dangerous and inhumane, and some patients might never be able to function normally without continued access to their substances of dependence. This professional disagreement created inconsistent practices across the country, with some doctors adopting strict withdrawal protocols while others maintained patients on indefinite prescribing regimens.

The debate was further complicated by the social characteristics of the addicted population. Unlike the criminal drug users who had captured public attention, most medically maintained addicts were middle-aged, middle-class individuals who had originally become dependent through legitimate medical treatment. These patients often led otherwise respectable lives and posed no apparent threat to public order. The question of whether such individuals deserved continued medical support or should be forced into withdrawal regardless of the consequences proved both practically and ethically sticky mud.

Minister of Health John Wheatley made the decision in September 1924 to convene an expert committee to examine these issues systematically. The formation of the Departmental Committee on Morphine and Heroin Addiction represented an attempt to resolve the fundamental tensions in British drug policy through careful examination of medical evidence and expert opinion.

As president of the Royal College of Physicians, committee chairman Sir Humphry Rolleston brought considerable medical authority to the proceedings, but perhaps more importantly, he was known as an advocate for the disease model of addiction, particularly in relation to alcoholism. All members were drawn from the medical profession, representing either government health agencies or professional medical organizations. Notably absent were representatives from law enforcement, the criminal justice system, or moral reform organisations.

The committee were tasked with determining the circumstances, if any, under which the continued supply of morphine and heroin to addicted individuals could be considered medically advisable, and with recommending appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of prescribing privileges. This formulation implicitly acknowledged some form of continued prescribing might be legitimate while seeking to establish clear parameters for such practices.

The Rolleston Era "British System"

The conclusions reached by the Rolleston Committee report in 1926 represented a remarkable departure from the increasingly punitive approaches being adopted elsewhere in the world, establishing principles which prioritised medical judgement over criminal justice concerns and legitimised the long-term maintenance of addicted individuals under appropriate medical supervision.

The committee's most significant conclusion was their formal recognition that drug addiction constituted a legitimate medical condition requiring professional treatment rather than moral condemnation or criminal punishment. This seemingly straightforward declaration carried profound implications for how British society would approach the phenomenon of drug dependence. The committee explicitly stated that addiction was a disease, and as such, it fell naturally within the purview of medical professionals rather than the criminal justice system.

The committee established specific circumstances under which the continued prescription of addictive substances could be considered medically appropriate, defining two particular scenarios which would justify long-term maintenance prescribing: firstly, cases where complete withdrawal produced serious symptoms which could not be satisfactorily treated under ordinary conditions of private practice; and secondly, situations where patients were capable of leading useful and fairly normal lives whilst taking a certain non-progressive quantity of their drug of addiction, but ceased to be able to do so when their regular allowance was withdrawn.

This formulation was carefully calibrated to acknowledge the reality some individuals might require indefinite access to controlled substances whilst simultaneously establishing clear parameters for such prescribing. The committee emphasised maintenance should only be considered after every effort had been made to cure the addiction, and the quantities prescribed should typically be small and non-progressive. This approach represented a pragmatic compromise between the ideal of complete abstinence and the practical recognition forced withdrawal might sometimes cause more harm than continued controlled access.

The committee also established a framework: they mandated practitioners must notify the Home Office when they determined someone was addicted, creating a system of registration that would allow authorities to monitor the scope and nature of the addiction problem whilst still preserving the essentially medical character of treatment decisions. Crucially, however, this notification requirement did not transfer decision-making authority away from individual physicians, who retained the right to continue providing treatment and prescribing opiates to their addicted patients according to their professional judgement.

The committee strongly advocated for gradual reduction rather than abrupt withdrawal as the preferred treatment approach, arguing that sudden cessation was both medically dangerous and practically counterproductive because it was likely to drive patients toward illicit suppliers. This recommendation reflected their understanding effective treatment required maintaining the therapeutic relationship between doctor and patient, and overly harsh or rigid approaches would simply force addicted individuals underground rather than addressing their underlying condition.

The recommendations were swiftly incorporated into British law through amendments to the Dangerous Drugs Act in 1926. This legislative implementation represented more than a mere technical adjustment to existing regulations; it constituted a formal governmental endorsement of the medical model of addiction and established the legal framework within which what became known as the "British System" or "Rolleston Era" would operate.

The amended legislation preserved the essential principle any doctor could prescribe heroin, morphine, cocaine and other controlled substances to patients whom they determined to be dependent upon these drugs. Unlike more restrictive models that would emerge elsewhere, the British system imposed relatively few requirements on either prescribing physicians or their patients. Doctors were granted considerable clinical freedom to determine appropriate treatment regimens, whilst patients could typically collect their prescriptions from ordinary pharmacies and consume their medications more or less at will, subject to their physician's guidance.

This remarkably liberal approach depended fundamentally upon the professional integrity and clinical judgement of individual practitioners. The system assumed that doctors would exercise appropriate restraint in their prescribing practices and would genuinely attempt to help their patients rather than simply maintaining their addictions indefinitely. To support this assumption, the committee had recommended the establishment of a medical tribunal to promote the profession's own policing of members who became addicted or who engaged in inappropriate prescribing practices.

The implementation process also established the Home Office as the central coordinating authority for addiction-related matters, though in a monitoring rather than controlling capacity. A small staff within the Home Office became responsible for maintaining records of known addicts and overseeing the general operation of the system. Remarkably, during much of this period, a single staff member was responsible for all registrations and personally knew most of the addicts in Britain, frequently helping them find appropriate medical care or other assistance.

The Forty Years of Tranquility

The period following the implementation of the Rolleston recommendations became known as the "Rolleston Era," characterised by nearly four decades of remarkable stability in British drug policy and extraordinarily low levels of addiction-related problems. This era of tranquility was distinguished not merely by the absence of dramatic crises but by the positive achievement of maintaining drug addiction as a manageable medical issue rather than a significant social problem.

Following the establishment of the new system, the numbers of recorded opiate and cocaine addicts fell significantly in the early 1930s and remained stable at relatively low levels for the next two decades. This remarkable achievement stood in stark contrast to the experiences of other countries, particularly the United States, where more punitive approaches appeared to be associated with growing addiction rates and increasingly serious crime problems.

Most fundamentally, the system succeeded in preventing the development of a significant black market in controlled substances. Because addicted individuals could obtain their drugs through legitimate medical channels, there was little incentive for criminal entrepreneurs to establish illegal distribution networks. The absence of a substantial illicit market meant drug use remained largely contained within medical contexts rather than spreading through criminal or subcultural channels.

Because drug addiction remained a small-scale, medically managed phenomenon rather than a visible social problem, it attracted little negative attention from politicians, the media, or the general public. This political quiescence allowed the medical profession to continue operating according to the principles established by Rolleston without facing constant pressure for more restrictive approaches.

Whilst other countries, particularly the United States, adopted increasingly punitive approaches to drug control, Britain's relatively isolated geographical position and distinct political culture allowed it to maintain its distinctive approach without facing overwhelming external pressure to conform to international norms.

US Failure Spreads Over The World

Where Britain had developed a medical model based on therapeutic maintenance and professional discretion, America had pursued a path of prohibition and criminalisation that would eventually become the template for international drug control.

The Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, ostensibly a tax measure designed to regulate the distribution of narcotic drugs, was transformed through judicial interpretation and administrative enforcement into something far more restrictive than its original framers had envisioned. The Act required anyone who sold or distributed narcotics to register with the government and pay a small tax, whilst making detailed records of all transactions available for government inspection. Crucially, however, the legislation failed to address explicitly whether addicted individuals could receive prescribed supplies of narcotics on an indefinite basis.

This ambiguity proved fatal to any possibility of developing an American equivalent to the British system. Treasury Department officials who administered the law assumed a negative stance towards maintenance prescribing and initiated numerous prosecutions against addicts, physicians, and pharmacists for conspiracy to violate the Act. Although the Supreme Court initially rebuked the Treasury Department for attempting to prevent physicians from prescribing to addicts, it ultimately reversed itself in two crucial cases decided on 3 March 1919 (United States v. Doremus and Webb et al. v. United States). The Court ruled physicians might not write prescriptions for addicts "to keep him comfortable by maintaining his customary use," effectively outlawing maintenance prescribing and establishing the principle that addiction was not a legitimate medical condition requiring ongoing treatment.

Following the 1919 Supreme Court decisions, a number of American cities and towns had attempted to establish facilities to dispense narcotics to addicts, recognising the elimination of medical sources would force dependent individuals toward dangerous black market supplies. However, all of these clinics were eventually closed by the federal government, most within a year of opening their doors. Treasury Department officials, determined to eliminate both licit and illicit sources of narcotics for addicts, viewed the clinics as dangerous precedents that could undermine the rigorous enforcement of the Harrison Act as recently interpreted by the Supreme Court.

The last clinic, in Shreveport, Louisiana, was finally forced to cease maintenance operations on 10 February 1923, marking the beginning of what historians would later term the "classic" police era of narcotic control in America. This unprecedented approach to drug policy was characterised by the complete criminalisation of addiction and the systematic elimination of medical alternatives to prohibition. The contrast with British policy could hardly have been more stark, but American influence would prove decisive in shaping international approaches to drug control.

The UN's Disaster Management

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, adopted by the United Nations in 1961, represented far more than a simple consolidation of existing international drug control treaties; it constituted a fundamental shift in the philosophy and practice of global drug policy that would ultimately prove incompatible with the British system. The Convention explicitly aimed to limit "exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs," establishing a framework which prioritised prohibition over therapeutic approaches.

The treaty consolidated and broadened the scope of earlier agreements to include cannabis and other substances, whilst establishing the International Narcotics Control Board with overall control of drug production, international trade, and dispensation. Perhaps most significantly for Britain, the Convention contained implicit pressure toward uniformity in national drug policies, creating an international environment increasingly hostile to distinctive national approaches like the British system. Britain’s representative at the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), the policy-making body for the new UN international drug control system, was J.H. ‘Johnnie’ Walker. Bing Spear, a Home Office civil servant.

Despite considerable dissatisfaction on the American side with some aspects of the final treaty, the Convention fundamentally reflected American prohibitionist principles. As one observer noted at the time, the Convention was "greater than the sum of the parts it replaced," representing a significant break with the regulatory focus of preceding multilateral treaties in favour of a more prohibitive outlook.

Although the treaty did not explicitly prohibit maintenance prescribing, its emphasis on limiting drug access to purely medical and scientific purposes sat uneasily with the liberal prescribing practices that had characterised British policy. The Convention's requirement signatory nations implement domestic legislation consistent with its provisions meant Britain would eventually need to choose between maintaining its traditional approach and complying with international obligations. Sound familiar?

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a key ally of the United States, Britain faced significant diplomatic pressure to demonstrate its commitment to international drug control efforts. The alternative—maintaining policies that appeared to deviate from internationally agreed standards—risked diplomatic isolation and accusations of undermining global efforts to address what was increasingly perceived as a serious international problem.

The Boomers And Their Revolution

The Home Office was fully aware of this developing crisis by the mid-1950s. Internal memoranda from officials like Walker documented the emergence of "a small but potentially dangerous group of drug addicts (mainly heroin addicts) in London at the present time," characterised by their youth and their involvement in the entertainment industry. Walker noted that many of these new addicts "appear to obtain supplies from a small number of doctors who make no attempt whatever at cure or even, so far as can be judged, at reduction of the dose," and that "their addiction is deliberately fed, almost certainly in some instances for purposes of gain."

The emergence of a new generation of younger, recreational drug users fundamentally challenged the assumptions upon which the British system had been built, creating problems the existing framework was ill-equipped to address. The late 1950s and early 1960s witnessed the emergence of a very different pattern of drug use, centred around London's emerging youth culture and closely associated with music, fashion, and lifestyle changes that challenged conventional social norms.

The initial manifestation of this new drug culture was closely linked to the jazz scene, particularly the West End clubs (e.g. Four Aces Club, Metro Club, Flamingo Club, Sunset Club, etc) which attracted both Black immigrants from the Caribbean and young white Britons seeking alternative forms of entertainment and social expression. Cannabis use, long established in Caribbean culture, began to spread from immigrant communities to white youth, whilst jazz musicians and their audiences experimented with heroin and other substances in imitation of their American musical heroes.

Official statistics revealed a dramatic change in the demographics of known drug users: whilst in 1959 just 47 heroin addicts were known to the Home Office, by 1964 this figure had risen to 328. More significantly, the new addicts were younger—40% were under 35 years of age in 1964, compared with just 11% in 1959—and 94% of recently reported addicts were of non-therapeutic origin, meaning they had not become addicted through medical treatment but through recreational use.

LSD, which had arrived in Britain through figures like Michael Hollingshead and his World Psychedelic Centre in Chelsea, became closely associated with the emerging counterculture movement. The Beatles' experimentation with LSD during the filming of Help! in 1965 symbolised the mainstream penetration of psychedelic culture, whilst the release of Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band in 1967—an album steeped in drug mysticism and full of veiled references to drug use—demonstrated how deeply drug culture had penetrated British popular music and youth identity.

The Brain Committee & Misuse of Drugs Act

The government's response to the emerging crisis came through the reconvening of the Interdepartmental Committee on Drug Addiction, chaired by Lord Russell Brain, which had originally reported in 1961 with a relatively complacent assessment of the British drug situation. The committee's second report, published in November 1965, represented a dramatic shift in official thinking about drug addiction and marked the beginning of the end for the classic Rolleston approach.

The second report was notable for its adoption of epidemiological concepts which framed addiction as a "socially infectious condition" requiring "epidemiological assessment and control." The committee concluded whilst addicts should still be regarded as "sick persons," addiction was now a disease that, "if allowed to spread unchecked, would become a menace to the community." This formulation justified treating addiction not merely as a private medical matter but as a public health emergency requiring systematic intervention and control measures which went far beyond the gentle supervision that had characterised the earlier period.

The Brain Committee's recommendations proposed the right to prescribe heroin and cocaine to addicts should be limited to specially licensed doctors working in dedicated treatment centres, effectively removing this authority from general practitioners who had exercised it since the 1920s. The committee also recommended the establishment of compulsory notification systems and dedicated Drug Dependence Units that would centralise addiction treatment under specialist psychiatric supervision.

The government's acceptance of these recommendations, implemented through the Dangerous Drugs Act 1967, marked the formal end of the classic Rolleston system. The final stage in the transformation of British drug policy came with the passage of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, which represented both a consolidation of existing legislation and a fundamental shift toward the prohibitionist model which characterised international drug control. The Act was developed in response to multiple pressures: the need to incorporate the UN Single Convention into domestic law, growing public concern about drug use among young people, and political demands for a comprehensive response to what was increasingly perceived as a serious social problem.

The Act was originally introduced by Labour Home Secretary (and later Prime Minister) James Callaghan, who had explicitly rejected the more liberal recommendations of the Wootton Report on cannabis. Callaghan and other supporters of stricter drug laws framed their position in terms of protecting society from the excesses of the "permissive society" and maintaining traditional moral standards against the challenges posed by youth culture and social change.

The Misuse of Drugs Act established a three-tier classification system (Class A, B, and C) which categorised drugs according to their perceived harmfulness and set criminal penalties accordingly. Whilst the Act retained provisions for medical prescribing under carefully controlled circumstances, its primary emphasis was on prohibition and criminal sanctions rather than treatment and medical management. The Act also established the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs to provide expert advice on drug policy, but made clear that final decisions rested with politicians rather than medical professionals.

Perhaps most significantly, the Misuse of Drugs Act represented Britain's full accession to the international prohibitionist consensus that had emerged through the UN drug control system. The Act explicitly stated that it was designed to implement Britain's obligations under the Single Convention and subsequent international agreements.

The Catastrophic Aftermath & Psychoactive Substances Act

The irony of this transformation is that many of the problems that led to the abandonment of the Rolleston approach—drug-related crime, black market activity, and the involvement of young people in drug culture—became far more serious under the prohibitionist approach that replaced it. The forty years of tranquility which had characterised the Rolleston era were never restored, as Britain joined the international community in pursuing approaches to drug control which emphasised punishment over treatment and prohibition over medical management.

The UN Convention was later followed by the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) and the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988).

Since its implementation in 1973, the Misuse of Drugs Act has been modified hundreds of times through statutory instruments, with over 600 drugs now classified under its provisions. Major modifications have included the addition of benzodiazepines as Class C drugs in 1985, the classification of many cathinones as Class B drugs in 2010, and numerous amendments to control synthetic cannabinoids and novel opioids. The Act has also been updated with "generic statements" or "chemical space" laws that attempt to control entire families of chemically similar substances rather than individual compounds, recognising minor molecular modifications can easily circumvent substance-specific bans.

Political tensions emerged when the ACMD's evidence-based recommendations conflicted with government policy, most notably leading to the dismissal of Chairman David Nutt in 2009 for publicly criticising the reclassification of cannabis from Class C back to Class B against scientific advice.

Drug-related deaths have reached record levels, with over 4,000 deaths in 2020—the highest since records began. The classification system still lacks scientific basis, with alcohol and tobacco causing more harm than many Class A substances like LSD and MDMA, yet remaining legal and uncontrolled under the framework.

The emergence of "legal highs" or Novel Psychoactive Substances (NPS) in the mid-2000s exposed fundamental limitations in the traditional approach. These substances, often sold openly in "head shops" and online, exploited the time-consuming process required to ban specific substances under the MDA. By the time one substance was prohibited, chemists had already developed new variants with slightly altered molecular structures.

The Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 represented yet another radical departure from the traditional substance-specific approach. Rather than listing individual drugs, the Act attempted to ban entire categories of substances based on their psychoactive effects. The legislation defined a psychoactive substance as anything that "by stimulating or depressing the person's central nervous system...affects the person's mental functioning or emotional state," exempting only alcohol, tobacco, caffeine, food, medicines, and substances already controlled under the MDA 1971.

The Act made it an offence to produce, supply, offer to supply, possess with intent to supply, import, or export psychoactive substances, with maximum penalties of seven years' imprisonment. It also provided civil enforcement powers including prohibition notices and premises orders, enabling graduated responses to violations.

Sales shifted from regulated retail environments to street dealers and dark web markets, making products less predictable and potentially more dangerous. Data suggests increased potency of remaining substances, and deaths involving NPS actually increased by 222% in the three years following the Act's implementation. Use has become concentrated among the most vulnerable groups, particularly prisoners and homeless individuals, where synthetic cannabinoids like "Spice" have caused significant problems in prisons and contributed to violence and debt-related issues. Court cases have extended its scope to substances like nitrous oxide and poppers, leading critics to argue that the definition is now so broad it could theoretically include almost any substance with psychoactive properties.

The Nefarious Impact of Internationalisation

The Rolleston system represented precisely the kind of locally-evolved, pragmatic solution which emerges when nations address their own problems according to particular circumstances and values. Developed by British medical professionals for British conditions, it demonstrated the superiority of home-grown approaches over imported frameworks. Its remarkable four-decade success reflected fundamental insights often ignored by international institutions: addiction requires medical rather than criminal responses, prohibition can create more problems than it solves, and effective policy must adapt to local conditions rather than conform to abstract principles.

The destruction of this successful system through international pressure exemplifies how "internationalism" often serves as a mask for particular national interests. The Single Convention essentially imposed the failed American prohibitionist model globally, not because of its proven effectiveness but because of American geopolitical dominance. Britain was forced to abandon demonstrably superior policies—lower addiction rates, minimal drug-related crime, effective medical management—in favour of an approach which had already produced higher addiction rates and extensive criminal markets in America itself.

We abandoned values of professional discretion, medical compassion, and pragmatic problem-solving in favour of bureaucratic rule-following, moral condemnation, and ideological purity. These cultural traits, which had served us well across numerous domains, were systematically undermined by adoption of international norms embodying very different values.

As practitioners who had operated the successful system retired, their accumulated knowledge disappeared. When prohibition produced worse outcomes, there was no longer any living memory of alternatives. Effective approaches became literally unthinkable because the institutions and cultures that had sustained them had been dismantled.

The assumption complex problems can be solved through universal approaches administered by international institutions reflects technocratic hubris unsupported by historical evidence. The most effective policies emerge through experimentation and local learning rather than application of abstract principles developed in international forums.

The destruction of the Rolleston system stands as a cautionary tale about subordinating local knowledge and democratic preferences to international pressures. It demonstrates how effective, humane policies can be swept away by abstract principles which sound reasonable in international forums but prove disastrous in practice. That this success was sacrificed to international orthodoxy should serve as a permanent warning about allowing distant institutions to override local wisdom and democratic choice. The Brexit decision, whatever one's specific views, reflected recognition that such values matter and that the costs of international integration may sometimes outweigh its benefits.