The Implosive Cartel: Organising The Right's Byzantine Generals

In his now-infamous essay, "England Is Under Attack, From All Sides, And Within," Reiners lays out a full doctoral thesis on the multi-pronged assault on our country in crude terms, which he refers to as the "Blairite constitution": devolution; the human rights regime; unelected regulators; and electoral displacement. He notes the attack is not singular, but combined, synchronous, and from different directions simultaneously.

British political parties on both sides are in a bewildering mess: from Reform, Restore, and Advance, to Green, Majority, and Your Party (inshallah trans jezbollah, comrade). None of them, despite broadly being on each other's sides, are able to establish a strategy to electorally defeat the incumbent civil service uniparty.

The British back the horse they think will win. First-past-the-post (aka "winner takes all") has its name for a reason; we're a betting people and it's a horse race. Elections are like walking into a betting shop and choosing the horse one believes will win the race and get its nose past the post first. None of these parties are going to win, so none of us back them.

Which posits a fascinating intellectual challenge: can game mechanics be cleverly inverted here? Is there a way British voters can feel confident in voting for a smaller party, knowing they will be backing a potential winner?

There are 10 horses (parties) in a race, and the bookie (electoral commission) can't change the rules. 2 (labour, conservative) are very strong. 8 are small. The 8 get together and agree to share the prize. Before, the person betting on one smaller horse (e.g. DUP) had a 1/10 (10%, 9:1 against) chance of winning, but now they have an 80% (1:4 against, or 4:1 on) chance of winning. If the bookie still offers 9:1 payouts (constituency wins) on individual horses (parties), but you know 8 of them will share the win, you're getting 9:1 odds on what's now effectively an 80% probability event.

This has two names: in black markets, it's called a cartel. In game theory, it's called collective action. The strategy is called arbitrage. And it's absolutely lethal.

This is a strategy of co-opting structural incentives rather than fighting ideology: men (and voters) are predictable, self-interested, and cowardly when it comes to losses. Offer them a way to hedge, and they’ll come running. However, cartels tend to collapse under suspicion and ambition. The trick is not just forming one, but binding it with enough fear and self-interest so betrayal is costlier than loyalty.

That's where our Byzantine Generals come in.

What Is The Byzantine Generals Problem?

Six generals surround a fortress. They must all attack together to succeed, or all retreat together to avoid defeat. If some attack while others retreat, they'll be slaughtered.

The generals can only communicate by sending messengers between their camps. However, some of the generals might be traitors who want the attack to fail. These traitors will lie - they might tell half the generals to attack and half to retreat, ensuring disaster.

Each general receives messages like "Attack at dawn" or "Retreat immediately" from the others, but they don't know which generals are loyal and which are traitors. A traitor might send "Attack" to some generals and "Retreat" to others. Or a loyal general's messenger might be intercepted and the message changed.

The problem: How can the loyal generals coordinate and agree on the same plan (either all attack or all retreat) when they can't tell which messages come from traitors?

This is the Byzantine Generals Problem (aka Byzantine Fault Tolerance) - achieving agreement among a group when some members are unreliable or actively trying to sabotage the effort.

It is a game theory problem invented in 1982 by Leslie Lamport, Robert Shostak, and Marshall Pease. Byzantine consensus was conceived and formalised by Shostak, who dubbed it the interactive consistency problem in 1978 at the NASA-sponsored SIFT (Software Implemented Fault Tolerance) project created by John H. Wensley.

1776: A Real World Example

Picture the 13 colonies in 1776 as our generals surrounding the fortress - but now the fortress (Britain) has fallen. They've won their independence, but suddenly they face the Byzantine Generals Problem on a massive scale.

During the war, they had a clear common goal: defeat the British. Franklin's "Join, or Die" snake had rallied them against this external threat - they coordinated because survival depended on unity. The Continental Congress worked because everyone agreed on a single objective.

But once victory came, the "traitors" weren't enemy spies - they were competing interests within their own ranks. Each colony became like a general sending different messages to the others. Virginia might send word: "We need a strong federal government to pay war debts." Meanwhile, Rhode Island's messenger arrives saying: "No federal taxes - states should remain sovereign." Massachusetts wants trade regulations, while South Carolina opposes them. New York wants the capital there, Philadelphia disagrees.

Without external pressure from Britain forcing unity, the colonies couldn't agree on anything. Were these messages from "loyal" patriots or "traitors" to the common cause? How could they tell the difference between legitimate state interests and destructive self-interest?

The Articles of Confederation failed precisely because it couldn't solve this coordination problem. Each state could effectively "veto" any decision, just like traitors sabotaging the generals' attack plans. Without the common enemy which had made Franklin's "Join, or Die" so powerful, the colonies faced potential fragmentation - picked off one by one by foreign powers or torn apart by internal strife.

The Constitution was their solution to the Byzantine Generals Problem - a system to achieve consensus even when states had conflicting goals.

The Principles Of Implosion Design

This, naturally, might seem like an odd metaphor or analogy because of its nature, but the concept and theory is applicable to the political domain. Bear with it.

The core principle behind both designs of either type of nuclear weapon in use today is achieving a supercritical mass of fissile material (like uranium-235 or plutonium-239). When you have enough fissile material in a small enough space, neutrons released from spontaneous fission have a high probability of causing additional fissions before escaping, creating a chain reaction which releases enormous energy.

The gun-type design is conceptually simpler, and perhaps more analogous to the Farage-Reform-UK strategy towards the Tories. Imagine you have two pieces of uranium-235, each below critical mass when separated. The device fires one piece into the other at high velocity using conventional explosives, like shooting a bullet down a barrel. When the pieces combine, they form a supercritical mass and the chain reaction begins.

Conceptually, Farage has fired a gun into the body of the Conservative party, hoping to steal as many defectors as possible to reach the critical mass of a majority in Parliamentary seats.

The implosion design works differently: the opposite of explosion. Picture a hollow sphere of plutonium or uranium surrounded by specially shaped conventional explosives. When these explosives detonate simultaneously from all directions, they create an inward-traveling shock wave which compresses the fissile material to a much higher density. This compression achieves criticality not by adding more material, but by reducing the volume - the same mass in a smaller space means neutrons have less distance to travel before hitting another nucleus, making the chain reaction more likely.

The implosion method is more efficient and works with plutonium (which won't work in a gun design due to spontaneous fission rates), but requires extremely precise timing - all the explosive lenses must detonate within microseconds of each other to create uniform compression.

However, all explosives must fire. This is where we get to the Byzantine Generals link.

All the charges must combine at the same time to achieve the critical mass. If one charge does not fire, the compression generated by the explosion won't be enough, and the reaction won't go supercritical.

This is similar to first-past-the-post: you must achieve a supercritical majority within winner-takes-all game mechanics to secure an electoral majority of seats in the House. The implosion is the political destruction of Uniparty domination.

The Fortress & The Competing Generals

The growing constellation of right-wing parties—from Reform UK to the Christian People's Alliance, from Ulster unionists to Welsh nationalists—needn't be viewed as catastrophic division, but rather as multiple compression points capable of capturing vastly different segments of the electorate, whilst driving toward a common political critical mass.

In our conceptual mapping, Westminster represents the fortress to be captured, currently held by the "Uniparty"—the convergence of establishment politics which has dominated British governance for decades. The generals are no longer merely abstract smaller parties, but a specific constellation of right-wing movements:

• Reform UK under Nigel Farage
• Ben Habib's Advance UK
• Rupert Lowe's Restore Britain err, something, kinda
• Hope Not Hate's favourite Homeland Party
• Traditional UKIP
• David Kurten's Heritage Party
• The various Ulster unionist parties (DUP, UUP, TUV, etc.)
• Welsh nationalist parties (Gwlad, etc)
• Smaller hard-right parties (English Democrats, British Democrats, etc)
• Faith-based movements like the Christian Party and Christian People's Alliance

Each of these parties faces the fundamental dilemma attacking separately guarantees failure through vote-splitting, yet coordinating requires trust they cannot afford or refuse to give – because they're vain little idiots warring for imperial domination of the ashes in a zero-sum game.

The 2024 election starkly illustrated this, with Reform UK securing 14% of the national vote but winning only five seats, whilst establishment parties with concentrated support converted far lower vote shares into parliamentary dominance.

Yet within this apparent weakness lies the seed of a rather radical strategy: the implosion model.

The key insight isn't the power of any single explosive charge (e.g. Tommy Robinson, Labour scandals, Musk interference, etc), but rather how multiple smaller forces, acting in concert from different angles, create irresistible pressure toward the centre. When we apply this concept to electoral politics, we see fragmentation becomes a feature, not a bug—each party represents a directed charge aimed at a specific segment of the electorate, accessing voters others cannot reach.

Brokenhearted Tories aren't voting for Homeland, even if Gen Z does. Likewise, the Zoomerwaffen aren't voting for the Boomers hoarding the property they want.

Now let's revisit the Byzantine Generals Problem again, reworded for British politics.

Six political parties surround the Uniparty and its control of Westminster. They must all campaign together to succeed at first-past-the-post, or all stand down together to allow the largest to attempt to win. If some campaign while others stand down, they'll be slaughtered at the election.

The parties can only communicate by sending messengers between their leaderships. However, some of the parties and leaders might be political saboteurs and wets who want the campaign to fail. These leaders will lie - they might tell half the parties to campaign and half to stand down, ensuring disaster.

Each party receives strategy like "Campaign here" or "Stand down immediately" from the others, but they don't know which parties are loyal and which are competitors. A wet or competitors might send "Campaign in this place" to some parties and "Stand Down" to others. Or a loyal party's messenger might be intercepted and the strategy changed.

The problem: How can the loyal parties coordinate and agree on the same plan (either all campaign or all stand down) when they can't tell which strategies come from bad actors?

The Inevitable Trust Problem

The core insight from Byzantine fault tolerance is coordination doesn't require eliminating distrust—it requires protocols which function despite distrust. In distributed computing, Byzantine protocols assume up to one-third of participants may be actively malicious or faulty, yet still achieve consensus through carefully designed redundancy and verification mechanisms.

For our constellation of right-wing parties, this translates into accepting some potential coalition partners will inevitably defect, mislead, or sabotage agreements (e.g. Farage, Yusuf, etc.), but building systems robust enough to succeed anyway.

The implosion model naturally solves this trust problem through specialisation. Reform UK's appeal to disaffected former Labour voters in post-industrial towns doesn't compete with the Heritage Party's focus on social conservatives within London's racial communities. The Homeland Party's sophisticated environmental positions resonate with young nationalists concerned about Britain's natural heritage—a demographic which would never support Farage's economic populism. The Christian People's Alliance mobilises faith communities often ignored by secular conservatism, whilst regional parties like Gwlad and the Ulster unionists tap into Celtic and regional identities irreducible to simple left-right behaviours.

This specialisation eliminates the prisoner's dilemma at the heart of the Byzantine Generals Problem. Generals aren't all trying to breach the same gate but rather attacking different points of the fortress wall where they're strongest.

When parties cultivate entirely separate political ecosystems, the fear of betrayal diminishes because there's little to betray—their voter pools barely overlap, making cooperation genuinely positive-sum rather than zero-sum.

Parties As Laboratories of Democracy

Here we introduce a crucial enhancement to both the Byzantine framework and the implosion model: the concept of laboratories of democracy found in Jefferson's ideas of the US states experimenting with ideas at a local level.

Rather than viewing these multiple parties as merely fragmented opposition, one can reconceptualise them as specialised experimental units, each testing different approaches to governance, policy, and representation. This transforms fragmentation from weakness into strength, creating what one might call "political biodiversity."

Lots of parties become a good thing, if they agree to rule in coalition together once they win. Voting for a smaller party isn't a "wasted vote."

Each party naturally gravitates toward particular demographics, regions, or issue areas where they possess comparative advantage:

• Reform UK excels at mobilising middle-class voters around economic nationalism and immigration concerns.
• Advance UK has given a home to Tommy's working class pub football ground movement, and has a powerful weapon in Ben's highly-intellectual focus on business.
• Restore Britain, whatever it is, pulls cross-party support from Gen X and Zoomerwaffen with hard talk on mass deportations.
• The Homeland Party pioneers eco-nationalism, proving environmental concern isn't monopolised by the left.
• The Christian parties demonstrate how faith-based politics can transcend ethnic boundaries, reaching into African Christian communities with shared social conservatism.
• Regional parties like the Democratic Unionist Party and Traditional Unionist Voice serve as laboratories for different models of unionism, whilst Gwlad experiments with Welsh patriotism within a broader British framework.

These are all explosive charges of the implosion weapon.

When someone as messy as the Homeland Party successfully frames environmental protection as patriotic duty (which will really upset the Greens and HNH), they've discovered a political formula which establishment parties missed. When the Christian People's Alliance mobilises previously apathetic faith voters, they've identified an untapped electoral resource. When Reform UK converts Red Wall Labour voters, they've proven class loyalty can be redirected through economic populism. Each successful experiment expands the total addressable market of right-wing votes rather than cannibalising existing support.

Each of these is not only a Byzantine General around the fortress, but an explosive charge in an implosion design bringing compression on the core.

A pre-election pact would explicitly acknowledge this experimental variety as strategy.

Rather than forcing ideological convergence, a cartel agreement before the election would specify governance arrangements allowing each party to lead in their areas of expertise.

Advance UK might take responsibility for business policy, Reform for immigration and economic reform, Christian parties for family policy and religious freedom, regional parties for devolution and local governance. This transforms the traditional weakness of coalition governments—policy compromise and dilution—into structured experimentation across different policy domains. And employs the wicked cunning of a cartel.

From Fragmentation to Critical Mass

In our implosion model, each party represents a directed explosive charge aimed at a specific segment of the electorate. When multiple charges detonate simultaneously, they create what physicists call a longitudinal compression wave—pressure which increases exponentially as forces converge.

Consider the mathematics. Reform UK might mobilise five million disaffected Red Wall voters who would never vote Conservative. The Christian People's Alliance could activate two million faith voters who've historically abstained. The Heritage Party could pull in urban social conservatives from ethnic minority communities. The Ulster parties mobilise regional identity whilst maintaining union compatibility. Gwlad captures Welsh patriots who reject both Labour and Conservative offerings.

Crucially, these audiences don't significantly overlap. The young eco-nationalist voting Zoomerwaffen won't be torn between their extreme ideas and Reform's boomer Toryism. Those supporting Heritage for traditional values won't be considering the explicitly Christian parties. The Welsh patriot backing Gwlad isn't weighing them against the Ulster unionists. This isn't vote-splitting—it's vote-aggregation from previously unreachable segments.

The compression wave occurs when these forces converge on Westminster through a sophisticated pre-election pact.

Unlike traditional coalitions where parties compete then combine, this model has parties cultivating entirely separate political ecosystems which merge only at the point of governance. The result could theoretically push the combined right-wing vote well above 50%—not through converting existing Conservative voters, but through massive expansion of the total participant base. Or as the physicists would call it, critical mass.

Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Stake

The blockchain revolution introduced novel answers to Byzantine consensus through concepts like proof-of-work and proof-of-stake. These mechanisms offer powerful conceptual frameworks for political coordination within our implosion model.

Proof-of-work demonstrates commitment through irreversible expenditure of resources. When a party invests years developing sophisticated environmental policy, they're essentially "mining" for the right to be recognised as the cartel's environmental voice.When Christian parties build networks in faith communities, they're proving their unique access to theological and moral voters.

This creates natural selection pressure: parties who can't demonstrate real value to the cartel naturally fall away.

Each party's "work" in their specialist area becomes their demonstration of both competence and unique value. Reform's sheer size and brand recognition grassroots mobilisation in post-industrial towns proves their capability which no other party can replicate. The Ulster parties' decades of navigating sectarian divisions demonstrate irreplaceable regional expertise. These aren't just electoral tactics but demonstrations of governing capability in specific domains.

Proof-of-stake translates into parties putting their political capital at risk through the cartel agreement. A party agreeing to stand down in certain constituencies effectively stakes their reputation on the agreement's success.

But in the implosion model, this stake is asymmetric—parties primarily stand down where they're weak anyway, focusing resources where they're strong. This makes the stake less costly while maintaining the binding commitment that prevents defection. It also plays to the specifics of FPTP's game mechanics where the choice of battleground matters more than the numbers.

Prepare, Commit, Reply

Modern distributed systems achieve consensus through sophisticated multi-phase protocols. Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance uses a three-phase approach: prepare, commit, and reply. This maps remarkably well onto political cartel building within the implosive design.

Prepare

Parties signal their willingness to cooperate whilst demonstrating their unique value propositions. Reform UK might showcase their polling strength in Red Wall seats. Christian parties provide evidence of faith community mobilisation. This phase generates shared understanding of each party's irreplaceable contribution without premature lock-in.

Commit

This phase requires simultaneous, public declarations which become costly to reverse. But here's where the model innovates: the announcement wouldn't just detail constituency agreements, but present a complete shadow government with specified portfolios matching each party's proven expertise.

Voters would see before the election exactly how their vote translates into governance—a vote for any cartel partner becomes a vote for the entire experimental programme.

Reply

Local activists serve as distributed validators, but they're validating non-competition rather than active cooperation. It's easier to verify Reform isn't campaigning in a Christian People's Alliance stronghold (if or when such a thing exists) than to verify they're actively supporting each other. This negative validation is more robust than positive validation, reducing the verification burden.

Solving the Oracle Problem

The oracle problem—verifying real-world information within a trustless system—finds unique solution through the variety of our cartel parties. Each specialised party brings different intelligence capabilities and networks which naturally cross-validate information.

Advance UK's working-class networks provide ground truth from post-industrial Britain. The Christian parties maintain relationships with faith leaders across denominations. Restore's young activists offer intelligence from online spaces and university campuses. Heritage's connections in ethnic minority communities provide insights invisible to traditional polling. NI parties possess deep local knowledge accumulated over decades.

When Reform's pub networks, Christian parties' church connections, and Restore's online communities all report similar constituency intentions, the signal becomes highly reliable despite potential noise from any single source. It's analogous to ensemble methods in machine learning, where multiple weak predictors combine to form a strong predictor.

Game Theory and Electoral Mathematics

Where this becomes wickedly cunning and Machiavellian is the mechanics. Traditional FPTP punishes division because parties compete for the same voters. But when parties target non-overlapping segments, the mathematics invert. Each additional party in the cartel potentially adds voters rather than splitting them.

Consider the Nash equilibrium in this new framework. Reform UK withdrawing from urban constituencies with large ethnic minorities isn't a concession—it's optimisation, focusing resources on winnable post-industrial seats. The Heritage Party avoiding rural constituencies isn't surrender but strategic concentration on urban social conservatives. Each party maximises their seat count not through universal competition but through targeted excellence in their experimental domain.

A Reform voter in a UKIP-winnable seat can confidently vote Reform, knowing both parties will enter government together. This removes the tactical voting dilemma entirely. Every vote for any coalition partner strengthens the whole, creating positive-sum dynamics where each party's success strengthens the coalition's overall position.

Or put bluntly, you can vote for any of the 8 horses, and win no matter who the victor is.

The iterated nature of elections under this model creates particularly strong incentives for cooperation: successful experiments in one party's laboratory benefit the entire coalition in subsequent elections. Restore's young voter participation becomes cartel achievement. Reform's economic policies which capture Tory defectors becomes shared victory. This creates a ratchet effect where the cartel grows stronger with each electoral cycle.

Evolving And Recalibrating

Real-world politics involves massive uncertainty—polls shift, scandals emerge, new issues arise. The laboratory model combined with implosion physics provides unique resilience through parallel experimentation and distributed risk.

Financial portfolio theory offers instructive parallels. Just as investors diversify across assets with different risk profiles, the cartel diversifies across different political experiments. Some parties pursue bold, high-risk policies in their strongholds. Others test incremental changes. Some focus on cultural issues, others on economic reform. This portfolio approach means individual failures don't doom the cartel—they become learning opportunities.

The concept of "real options" from financial theory also applies. Each party's local experiments create options for national scaling. A successful Advance programme in Devon creates an option for national rollout. Reform's economic regeneration programme in Middlesbrough creates a template for broader implementation. These options have value even if never exercised—they demonstrate the cartel's capacity for innovation and evidence-based governance.

Adaptive algorithms from machine learning suggest another approach: continuous recalibration based on feedback. After each local election, by-election, or polling release, cartel parameters could automatically adjust according to pre-agreed formulas. If Reform's economic message resonates more than expected, they might expand into adjacent constituencies. If Christian parties mobilise more voters than anticipated, their geographic scope increases. This dynamic FPTP reallocation optimises the implosion pressure continuously.

Hierarchical Consensus at Scale

As the number of parties and experiments increases, flat coordination becomes unwieldy. The answer mirrors how distributed systems handle scale: hierarchical federation. The implosion model naturally supports this structure, with local experiments feeding into regional syntheses and ultimately national policy.

At the constituency level, parties maintain maximum autonomy to experiment within agreed parameters. These local laboratories generate continuous data about what works in different contexts. A Christian People's Alliance initiative in Tower Hamlets might discover methods for engaging ethnic conservatives. A Restore experiment in university towns might identify messaging which resonates with educated young nationalists.

At the regional level, parties coordinate to identify successful experiments worth scaling and failures worth avoiding. The North West cluster might find economic populism dominates, whilst the South East discovers civic nationalism resonates more strongly. These regional variations inform resource allocation and messaging refinement.

At the national level, the cartel leadership synthesises findings into coherent policy frameworks which respect both local variation and national coherence. The shadow cabinet, with each party controlling relevant portfolios, ensures experimental learning translates into governing capability.

Breaking FPTP's Mathematics

First-past-the-post traditionally creates what we might call the "establishment stability zone"—as long as the dominant party maintains roughly one-third support, opposition fragmentation ensures their continued rule.

The mathematics seem ironclad: split the opposition vote among multiple parties, and the incumbent wins with a minority.

But the implosive cartel model inverts these mathematics. When each party in the coalition accesses different voter segments, the total addressable market expands dramatically. Instead of fighting over the same 40% of voters who might consider alternatives to the establishment, the cartel could theoretically access 60% or even 70% of the electorate by offering multiple entry points matched with different values, identities, and priorities.

The critical mass effect occurs when this expanded coalition reaches the tipping point.

In nuclear physics, critical mass is the minimum amount of fissile material needed to sustain a chain reaction. In electoral terms, it's the vote share at which FPTP's winner-take-all mathematics begin working for the coalition rather than against it.

With sufficient compression—enough parties bringing enough differing issue-voters together—the cartel could win supermajorities of seats even in traditionally safe establishment constituencies.

Consider a hypothetical constituency where the establishment typically wins with 40% of the vote: under traditional fragmentation, multiple opposition parties might split the remaining 60%, ensuring establishment victory.

But under the implosive model, if the cartel activates previously non-voting Christians (5%), young eco-nationalists (3%), disaffected working-class voters (10%), and regional patriots (2%), whilst maintaining the existing conservative base (35%), they suddenly command 55% of an expanded electorate. The establishment's 40% of the original electorate might now represent only 35% of the expanded electorate.

The game mechanics change when the 8 horses decide to act collectively to fix the race.

Overcoming Idiocy & Egos

The current proliferation of right-wing parties in Britain needn't be seen as political suicide but as the preliminary seed stage of a sophisticated electoral strategy. Like the multiple explosive charges in an implosion bomb, each party serves a specific purpose in creating the compression wave necessary for political critical mass.

The Byzantine Generals Problem teaches us coordination doesn't require trust, just robust protocols. Implosion shows us fragmentation can become strength when properly orchestrated. The laboratories of democracy concept reveals how variety enables experimentation and learning. Together, these ideas suggest a path forward which transforms apparent weakness into unprecedented strength.

If we can get past their f**king egos.

Reform's internal polling, revealed to the R, is circulating the idea they will get 500+ seats at the next election, which will be called in 2027 due an IMF bailout. They are barking, bats**t crazy on their own kool-aid.

The actual situation on the ground is worse:

• The Tories are electorally irrelevant and want to merge with Reform;
• Farage can't build a cartel to save his life despite adsorbing the Tory-lites: he hates Tommy, Boris, Rupe, Habib, and the Tories in general;
• Rupe hates Farage, has rejected Habib, and is hedging his bets on a "movement" run by useless Instagram zoomers while he tries to take over the Tories – but is competing with Jenrick.
• Habib is far and away the conciliatory intellectual winner, but has embraced Tommy, been rejected by Farage and Rupe, and is supported by a GB PAC Tory rotary club who want Jenrick and Boris;
• The NI unionists are ignored by basically everyone, despite having the most loyal and stoic patriotic politicians in the entire country;
• Homeland have imploded after having been tagged by HNH as extremists, yet are ridiculously popular among the Zoomerwaffen, who don't trust Reform and think Rupe is not extreme enough;

All of them have witch-like attractive women "assistants" and Instagrammers whispering disastrous, ruinous ideas in their ears.

All of them are going to be eaten alive by a militant, hostile civil service.

Unless they build a superweapon.

Multi-phase commitment protocols ensure agreements stick. Varying intelligence networks verify compliance. Game-theoretic incentives match individual and collective interest. Adaptive mechanisms handle uncertainty. Federal structures manage complexity whilst preserving autonomy.

The beauty of the Byzantine implosion cartel approach is that it scales positively—the more parties who join the cartel, the broader its reach becomes, as long as each brings unique access to previously unreachable voters. This inverts the traditional logic of political coalitions, where each additional partner means more compromise and dilution.

In the implosion model, each additional partner means more compression, more pressure, and ultimately more explosive potential when the electoral moment arrives.

The establishment's advantage has always been its unity against divided opposition. But unity doesn't require uniformity. Through the sophisticated application of these ideas, the idiot fractured right could transform their apparent chaos into coordinated compression, potentially achieving the critical mass necessary to detonate FPTP's mathematics and reshape British politics fundamentally.

The fortress walls of Westminster have stood through many attempted assaults by divided opposition forces. Perhaps it's time the generals learned victory doesn't require becoming a single army—it requires becoming a sophisticated implosion device where every component, however different, contributes to the compression wave that ultimately breaches the walls.

The question isn't whether such coordination is theoretically possible—the science demonstrates it is. The question is whether the political will exists to transform theory into practice, to turn fragmentation into fusion, and to prove in politics, as in physics, properly orchestrated action can generate more force than any single explosion ever could.